The Powerplay of Meat and Politics in India

**Akanksha Tiwari

In 2025, news broke out that the Uttar Pradesh government led by Shri Yogi Adityanath has ordered a ban on the sale of meat within 500 metres of religious places only during the Chaitra Navaratri. This trend suggests that any difference in diet that stems from religious, cultural or linguistic lines is seen as a threat to society and attempts are made by the governments to discipline and homogenise cultural practices. The act of reducing an affordable source of nutrition to vulgar contraband, resorting to violence to discipline the non-vegetarians, and isolation of children based on non-vegetarian diet in school raises questions on the role of the executive, legislative and judicial authorities in perpetuating such ideas within the social fabric of the country.  

On 4th April 2022, Mukkesh Suryaan, the Mayor of South Delhi Municipal Corporation, issued a mere statement to ban the sale of meat during Navaratri. The Mayor without any official order had announced that the meat shops under his civic body shall be shut during the “auspicious period of Navaratri.” Nevertheless, the Mayor insisted that the ban does not violate any personal liberty and defended the statement through a comparison with Islamic countries where drinking of water publicly is restricted during Ramadan. This analogy, however has no substance in the Indian secular framework. Therefore, raising questions about the authority of the executive and the legality of the scope of power exercised by them. 

Administrative Overreach and Violation of Fundamental Rights –

Considering that no official order was passed, the ban brings into perspective several illegalities leading to administrative overreach. The arbitrariness can be trisected into the following issues- 

Firstly, the primary issue arises with regards to the authority responsible for exercising the power within the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. In the present case, the authority communicating such a ban was the South Delhi Mayor, Mr Mukkesh Suryaan. However, the actual authority to promulgate such a ban under the said Act is the Commissioner and not the mayor. Under Section 405 of the Act, only the Commissioner of the corporation can exercise discretionary powers in terms of shutting down any municipal markets or slaughterhouses. Further, the Parent Act (the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957) does not allow any sub-delegation of power from the Commissioner to the mayor. Hence, in the absence of authority, the discretionary power exercised by the Mayor in this case, is ultra vires. 

The mayor derives his power from the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957, however, the Act only discusses the electoral process, duties and procedures enshrined within Sec 35-38 of the Act. While the Mayor can oversee and regulate issues concerning “health” and “hygiene,” it is not explicitly mentioned within the Act, hence, there is no law that the mayor can invoke to validate his actions. The mayor can only provide suggestions to the Commissioner and not make decisions unanimously. 

Secondly, the scope of power exercised by the Commissioner under Sec 405 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act envisages two interpretations. Under Section 405(1), the Commissioner is empowered with the executive authority to establish and maintain municipal markets and slaughterhouses. The section particularly lays down economic and business criteria as parameters of control exercised by the Commissioner. Hence, in the present case, the powers of the mayor does not fall under the said criteria. 

Whereas, under Section 405(2), the Commissioner possess the power to control and shut any municipal market and slaughterhouse by issuing a public notice. The discretionary power exercised by the Commissioner under this sub-section is extremely wide as it does not specifically prescribe any particular grounds of closure. While this sub-section lacks explicit criteria, judicial interpretation has helped define its limits, such as, in the case of Mohd. Iqbal Qureshi and Ors. Vs. Manager, Delhi Slaughter House and Ors, the High Court of Delhi established that the Corporation under Section 405-507 must provide and maintain slaughterhouses. It further emphasized that the Corporation, under Section 42, must perform its obligatory functions to make adequate provisions to ensure sanitation and removal of filth, and other polluted matters. 

Similarly, in the case of Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union Territory of Delhi and Ors., the petitioner had filed a Public Interest Litigation concerning the inhuman, unhygienic and horrible conditions prevalent at the Idgah Slaughter House of Delhi. As a result, the Court for the purposes of public interest cited the failure of Corporation for fulfilling its duties under Section 42, 405, 406, and 407 and directed either the closure of the Idgah slaughter house or operation upon maintaining certain standards of hygiene. 

It can be concluded that the discretion of the Commissioner under Section 405(2) must be exercised in consonance with the larger public interest. Considering that the powers vested under this sub-section is so broad, it is susceptible to be misused by the Commissioner leading to arbitrary action. To take what happened in Delhi is also one of arbitrary action and cannot be equated on the same grounds as the two cases. As the grounds for banning the slaughter of meat is only restricted to the nine-day period of the Navratri festival extending from April 2, 2022, to April 11, 2022 and not indefinitely and only for the purposes of preserving the religious beliefs and sentiments of devotees. None of which is envisaged in the Section 405 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and nor is it in the benefit and interest of the public at large. Thus, it can be concluded that the actions of the mayor amount to ‘colourable exercise of power,’ that is, Mayor intends to fulfil its ulterior motives under the guise of legitimate exercise of power hence, justifying its ban under the veil of “health” and “hygiene,” while it is clearly indicative of religious and political motive. Thus, the statement of the Mayor is largely a political propaganda bereft of any legal or statutory backing as it fails to justify the grounds of initiating a ban under Section 405 (1) and 405(2). 

Thirdly, the ban on the meat sale is violative of the three fundamental principles of the Constitution of India, that is, the freedom of equality, freedom to trade, and the right to “decisional autonomy” and free choice. 

Under Art. 14 and 15 of the Indian Constitution, equality and non-discrimination are fundamental human rights principles. The ban on the sale of meat and the operation of slaughterhouses certainly perpetuates such discrimination. Further, by employing tests of Reasonable Classification which  refers to differential treatment based on reasonability and objectivity, such a power must not be used arbitrarily and artificially by the State. 

The ban also violates the freedom to trade under Art 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The restriction to such a right is also conferred under Art 19 (6) only to preserve the interest of the general public. However, banning the sale of meat for nine days to preserve the sentiments of certain religious communities does not amount to fulfilling the ‘interest of the general public.’ In the case of Mohd. Faruk vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others, the Court held that the prohibition on exercising the fundamental right to engage in an occupation, trade or business will not be considered reasonable if it is not justified on the grounds of public interest but solely to accommodate the sentiments of a particular group whose beliefs and lifestyle differ from the claimant. 

Additionally, while the right to food is not an explicit provision promised under the Constitution, Art. 21 (decisional autonomy) can be interpreted to include the right to food and other necessities under the right to live with human dignity. 

The incident of the closure of slaughterhouses and the ban on the sale of meat during Navaratri also raises questions on the violation of the Doctrine of Proportionality. As decided in the case of K S Puttaswamy vs Union of India, it is an established principle of International Human Rights Law that any interference or restriction of the fundamental rights of individuals must fulfil three requirements – a) they are prescribed by law; b) they are essential to achieve a legitimate aim; and c) they are proportionate to the aim with the object sought to be achieved. Hence, the Doctrine of Proportionality is an essential tool to protect against the arbitrary practices of the State. 

Thus, while the “golden triangle” protects individuals from any encroachment upon their fundamental rights, the ban on the sale of meat by a statement issued by the Mayor of South Delhi Municipal Corporation is a blatant violation of the Constitutional principles of India. 

Conclusion 

The above-mentioned analysis clearly establishes that the statement of South Delhi Mayor Mukkesh Suryaan, has resulted in grave administrative overreach and violation of fundamental rights. Despite the illegality, the legal system in India is largely governed and manipulated by power politics leading to arbitrary exercise of authority without proper scrutiny. To conclude, the article extensively delves into highlighting that food has turned political in India and vegetarianism has been weaponised by the right and to achieve this agenda the executive is overreaching its administrative powers by exercising uncontrolled discretionary powers yet the remedy available remains inadequate. 

**Akanksha Tiwari, LL.B. (Hons.), OP Jindal University.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog do not necessarily align with the views of the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.