The Impact of Constituency Freeze (Part 1)
A Study of Representative Democracy and Electoral Inequality (2002-2026)
**Basil Gupta
**This is the first piece in the two-part series on the impact of the constitutional freeze
Delimitation exercise means readjustment of territorial boundaries of constituencies to achieve proper representation. The freeze on the delimitation of constituencies was first applied in 1976 and further extended up to 2026. It was to stabilise the federal dynamics against having large and varying population growth rates in all the regions. As a consequence of that freeze, parliamentary and legislative assembly constituencies continued to be stuck at the level prescribed by 1971 census data, creating a high disparity in the voter-representative ratio. This disparity affected democratic principles and accentuated the urban-rural divide where densely populated urban constituencies entail diverse governance needs and experience poorer quality of representation when compared with rural constituencies. This article tries to explore the delimitation process with the underlying constitutional framework of the freeze on delimitation, advocate for measures that resolve the disparities created due to the freeze and preserve the integrity of India’s democracy by making the electoral framework adaptable to ever-growing demographic and socio-economic realities.
I. Introduction
Delimitation is the process of redrawing electoral boundaries and has been pivotal to preserving representative democracy in India. This exercise guarantees that voters are distributed fairly across constituencies, preserving the democratic principle of “one person, one vote, one value.” But this principle has faced significant challenges for decades, with the promulgation of a constituency freeze that began in 1976 and only got worse in 2001 by the extension of the freeze. The freeze broke the delicate equilibrium, one in which population growth was matched with political representation, resulting in an electoral imbalance that continues to disrupt the functioning of India’s democracy.
India’s first delimitation exercise started soon after Independence, with the first delimitation exercise being carried out for the 1952 general elections. At that time, the delineation of constituencies was done by the President of India acting on the advice of the Election Commission. This was the adoption of a system of representative by territory, as opposed to the proportional representation systems adopted by some Western democracies. On the other hand, territorial representation splits the country into electoral constituencies, and each constituency aims to represent about the same number of voters. This architecture was based on constitutional arrangements of Articles 81 and 170, which allowed for a proportioned allocation of legislative seats.
There were three major delimitation exercises thereafter—those that occurred in 1952, 1963, and 1973—and each one adjusted the constituencies based on populations in the preceding decade’s censuses. The primary purpose was to establish a balance between the size of a vote and the number of representatives that were needed, and this was critical in a country characterized by divergent population density and regional disparities. It was the 42nd Constitutional Amendment which happened in 1976 that kept the figure of Assemblies and districts of the legislature based on the 1971 Census figures until the year 2001. This represented a departure from the requirement under the Constitution for regular rearrangements of boundaries and was seen as a response to the issue of inter-state disparity about rates of increase in population.
The freeze was explained to protect the integrity and equity of the federation. Southern states that had adopted efficient population control policies were afraid of being outvoted by northern states which were growing in population at a faster rate. The 42nd Constitutional Amendment also tried to insulate these states from the political repercussions of their demographic success by placing a freeze on representation at 1971 levels. Paradoxically, the freeze created new challenges, including violations of the constitutional principle of equal representation. Constituencies with higher population growth were enlarged disproportionately, diminishing the weight of the individual votes, while the other constituencies retained their vote weight where the growth rate was relatively slower.
The 84th Constitutional Amendment in 2001 continue the suspension until after the 2026 census, perpetuating such inequalities. Interestingly, the Delimitation Act of 2002 only allowed for what can be regarded as minor modifications that permitted amendments to intra-state boundaries based on the 2001 census. However, the overall number of seats allocated to each particular constituencies were not tampered with, thus sustaining structural inequities. These measures are indicative of the tensions which exist between providing demographic justice, maintaining federal equilibrium and political expediency in a heterogeneous and populous democracy.
The policies formulated from freeze to delimitation have serious repercussions for India as 2026 approaches. The freeze though protected the federal structure, but it mutilated the equality of representation and therefore raised the question of the integrity of Indian democracy. This article considers the history of delimitation, the reasons assigned to it by the constitution, and the role of the freeze in representative democracy.
II. Constitutional Framework and Legal Evolution
The Constitution of India provides a framework of Delimitation under Articles 82 and 170, which advocates for proportional representation and equitable democracy. However, the 42nd Amendment enacted, limited the reallocation of constituencies, and the 84th Amendment passed further disturbed this principle by entrenching disparities between states and constituencies. In this section, the constitutional and legal basis of delimitation is reviewed, as well as the history of the delimitation exercises and the impact of these delimitation exercises.
A. Articles 82 and 170: Constitutional Mandate
Article 82 and Article 170 form the constitutional basis of the delimitation scheme in India. Article 82 grants power to the Parliament to legislate delimitation after every decennial census so that boundaries for electoral constituencies are reviewed periodically on account of population changes. Article 170 empowers the Legislature to allocate seats to the various state legislative assemblies based on the population, further emphasizing the principle of proportional representation. Together, these provisions set up a constantly changing and dynamic electoral boundary system based on demographics.
The initial three delimitation exercises occurred in 1952, 1963 and 1973 adhered strictly to the prescribed constitutional mandates. These delimitation operations ordinarily strike a reasonable balance between states based on their various growth rates. For example, the census of 1961 resulted in adjustments so that states with high population growth, such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, were granted additional representation depending on their demographic weight; this system maintained the basic democratic tenet of “one person, one vote,” securing an equal influence on the legislative decisions across the country for one and all.
However, the freeze, in the year 1976, disrupted this equilibrium. It halted the reallocation of the seats as per the subsequent censuses and decoupled representation from population dynamics. In 2021, the states that must have 80 seats in the Lok Sabha like Uttar Pradesh, with its more than 230 million population, have the same number of seats as they did in 1971. Meanwhile, Kerala, with a significantly smaller population of around 36 million, retains 20 seats. It makes votes in low-growth states disproportionately weighted and off-balance.
B. The 42nd Constitutional Amendment: Imposition of the Freeze
The 42nd Amendment of 1976 put in a lot of changes in the delimitation framework. It arranged the freezing of the size of Lok Sabha and state assembly constituencies based on the 1971 census, which meant invalidating the periodic and empirical readjustments envisaged by Articles 82 and 170. This effectively put a halt till the census of 2001 on the periodic revision of boundaries for 30 years.
The diverging demographic growth was the driving force behind the freeze. The southern states were likely to lose representation to the north, as northern states were experiencing rapid population growth; to prevent this, the 42nd Amendment froze representation at the federal level to 1971 levels for the maintenance of federal equilibrium. This, however, contravened the principles of equality in representation and subsequently resulted in differences between the constituencies, all growing at different rates.
C. The 84th Constitutional Amendment: Extension of the Freeze
The 84th Amendment also further extended the delimitation freeze until 2026, except for some minor adjustments intra-state, based on the 2001 Census. Such a dual move was intended to address growing intra-state discrepancies without modifying the allocation of seats inter-state.
Political and demographic considerations exercised a heavy influence over the freeze. The southern states catered to the freezing because, after having implemented population control measures, it was likely they could lose representation to northern states whose populations were growing at a much higher rate. Due to the continued extension of the freeze, the amendment consolidated the political power of the states with low or no growth to ensure their continuing leverage in the making of federal decisions. Take, for example, Tamil Nadu, which cut fertility rates down to below replacement levels by the 1990s, and it continued to retain 39 Lok Sabha seats, an allowance that staved off the separate power of the population-based system.
Despite the amendment’s intention to create a balance in federal stability, it created inequalities. States like Bihar or Rajasthan, which have far more enormous populations, are severely underrepresented in the Parliament. In Rajasthan, for example, there are only 25 Lok Sabha seats for a population of over 85 million. The ratio of voters per representative is much higher in these states compared to smaller states. The 84th Amendment, although politically convenient, delayed the resolution of these structural inequities and heightened tension between high-growth and low-growth regions.
D. Legal Justifications for the Constituency Freeze
The freeze on constituency description was justified, on two main grounds: firstly, to keep population under control, and secondly, to maintain stability in federalism. For example, in the 1970s, when southern states adopted vigorous family planning measures, fertility rates plummeted, while northern states struggled with socioeconomic problems and continued high population growth. Without the freeze, proportional representation would have punished southern states for the demographic investments they had made, and this would have resulted in a decrease in their parliamentary and assembly seats.
The freeze on constituency reallocation has solidified systemic inequities, instilling uneven support for low-growth states, while degrading the voice of high-growth regions. Uttar Pradesh is a prime example, as it is stuck with an obsolete seat allocation dating back to the 1971 Census, whilst there have been huge demographic and population growths. With a population cushion beyond 230 million by 2026, Uttar Pradesh is still allowed only 80 Lok Sabha seats. On the other hand, Kerala has a population of about 36 million and is allowed to keep its 20 seats. The denominator for a constituency in Uttar Pradesh has thus turned out to be about 2.87 million, while for Kerala, it is only 1.8 million. Consequently, this tends to dilute the electoral heft of the voters in high-growth states, thus impairing representation.
The legal rationale for the freeze is that it provides stability, but its long-term repercussions have gained substantial scrutiny in recent times. Scholars and policymakers have called for reviving the freeze to restore the equilibrium between representation and demographic realities, especially with 2026 inexorably approaching.
E. Implication
These delimitation exercises have significant implications such that they became a cornerstone for the democratic framework of the country while simultaneously contributing to the feeling of representative governance and regional parity. The first three exercises held in 1952, 1963, and 1973, all took place by the constitutional directive of changing constituency boundaries based on the population data of the most recent census. These practices took essentially the concept of proportional representation and were reflective of India’s demographic diversity, therefore purporting the principle of “one individual, one vote”. For instance, the 1963 exercise was aimed at accommodating dramatic shifts in populations caused by urbanization and migration by changing constituencies so that the parity in the ratios of voters to representatives remained continued. The 1973 delimitation also increased representation in the high-growth states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, while limited representation in the rural areas that had lost population in recent decades thus balancing the interest of both urban and rural areas.
However, the freeze imposed in 1976 fundamentally changed this trajectory by decoupling constituency boundaries from demographic realities. The 2002 exercise permitted limited intra-state adjustments based on the 2001 census, but it did not address larger inter-state discrepancies. The partial measures heightened the existing inequalities since the urban constituencies of Maharashtra and Delhi became unduly large as compared to their counterparts in low-growth states. Thus, delimitation exercises, while historically significant, further entrenched systemic imbalances within India’s system of representative democracy, bringing into focus some serious questions precisely about the electoral frameworks regarding equity and dynamics, especially with the deadline of 2026 being brought to light.
III. Demographic Shifts and Representative Disparity
The electoral system adopted by India to equitably and adequately represent its gigantic and diverse population encounters significant challenges owing to demographic changes that occurred between 2001-2026. The freeze on delimitation locked the number of parliamentary and assembly seats and, thus, did not change electoral boundaries despite immense demographic changes. Hence, one can conclude that due to this freeze, disparities in voter-member ratios formed, especially between high-growth and low-growth states.
This section examines the demographic trends that account for these disparities, the statistical information on voter-representative ratios, the case studies comparing states of varying growth rates, and the implications of these demographic changes for India’s federal structure and political mobilization dynamics.
A. Population Growth Patterns Across States (2001–2026)
There are stark differences in the growth rates across different Indian states from 2001 to 2026. States such as Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka have evidenced slower increases in population owing to increased literacy, better health care, and extensive family planning programs. For example, Kerala’s population rose modestly from 31.8 million in 2001 to an estimated 36 million in 2026 – an increase of 13% over 25 years.
However, a significant increase has occurred in the northern states, such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Rajasthan. In 2001 Uttar Pradesh was already India’s most populous state with a population of 166 million and is expected to grow to over 230 million by 2026-an increase of nearly 39%. Bihar’s population is estimated to increase from 82.8 million to 131 million over the same period enormous increase of 58%.
Fig: The bar chart illustrates the population growth trends for the specified states in 2001 and the projected population for 2026.
Demographic divergence exacerbates inequalities in representation. The freeze on delimitation only serves to further increase the strength and size of constituencies of fat-growth states, while low-growth states have relatively smaller and more manageable constituencies.
B. Statistical Analysis of Voter-Representative Ratios
The inequities in the ratio of voters to representatives hegemonize into a huge problem because of demographic divergence. The allocation of Lok Sabha seats is based on census figures from the 1971 census; hence it has become increasingly out of line with present-day dynamics.
As of 2001, each Lok Sabha seat in Uttar Pradesh had an approximate average population value of 2.08 million, compared to Kerala’s of only 1.59 million. In 2026, the gap will be further widened in the state of Uttar Pradesh, with the average constituency size across the state likely to exceed 2.87 million. Conversely, on average, Kerala’s constituencies will have only around 1.8 million voters. This imbalance then means that voters in high-growth states have less electoral clout than their brethren in low-growth states.
This is more acute in urban areas like Delhi and Mumbai. The population of constituencies in some areas reaches well above 3 million, putting elected representatives under incredible pressure and weakening their ability to effectively serve their electorates. Such disparities demand better electoral boundaries to ensure evenness and equity in representation.
C. Case Studies: High-Growth vs. Low-Growth States
Uttar Pradesh is a classic case of the problems that high-growth states face. The population may rise to beyond 230 million by 2026 and yet the number of seats in the Lok Sabha remains stagnant at 80. This made constituency sizes in UP larger than the average size in the country. The imbalance diminishes the power of each vote and heaps extraordinary responsibility on representatives to represent millions of constituents.
On the contrary, Kerala had slow population growth, matching its high socio-economic indicators. With its 20 Lok Sabha seats unchanged since 1971, Kerala’s average constituency size is among the smallest in the country of the features that allow representatives to interact with constituents personally for better governance.
In Delhi and other metropolitan areas, high population density and urbanization have posed unique challenges. Areas like Chandni Chowk, which had a population of 3,50,000 in the year 2001, seem dwarfed by Outer Delhi, with over 3 million residents. Such glaring differences bring forth the inequities embedded in the present system.
D. Impact on Federal Power Dynamics
The disparity in representation is bound to cause serious repercussions for India’s federal constitution. The freeze on any further delimitation at the expense of high-growth northern states preserves the southern states’ political dominance while causing tensions between the two in the federal system. The southern states hold that the political advantages derived from the benefits of their successful population control policies should not translate, in any form, into diminished political clout for those states. Conversely, the northern states argue that the present arrangement is demographically restricted despite having significant demographic contributions.
This inequity has also added to the central allocation of resources and development priorities. States with lesser representation per capita-in this case, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar-are facing more difficulties in securing adequate funding and being heard in important policies, thus exacerbating regional inequalities.
** Basil is a Final Year B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) student at National Law University, Jodhpur. He is deeply passionate about engaging with contemporary legal issues and developments across a broad spectrum of legal fields. Through research and academic writing, he explores the intersections of various areas of law and aim to use writing as a tool to enhance legal understanding and promote dialogue within the academic and professional legal communities.
**Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog do not necessarily align with the views of the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.