The Impact of Constituency Freeze (Part 2)

**Basil Gupta

**This is the second piece in the two-part series on the impact of the constitutional freeze

Through an exploration of India’s constitutional provisions and the historical trajectory of the constituency freeze, the first part has uncovered the deep-rooted structural inconsistencies in political representation that have developed since 2002. While the freeze initially aimed to preserve federal equilibrium, its unintended consequence has been a growing disparity in voter influence across states. These developments raise critical questions about electoral equality and democratic integrity. In the forthcoming part, the author delves into the demographic shifts that have exacerbated these imbalances, assesses judicial perspectives, and discusses potential reforms that could reshape India’s representative democracy beyond 2026. 

I. Judicial and Legal Dimensions of Delimitation

The delimitation process in India, coupled with the constitutional freeze has been subject to serious scrutiny and constitutional debates. This part of the paper deals with judicial discourse related to delimitation processes, focusing on the role of the Supreme Court and the most important constitutional challenges and evolving legal interpretations of Article 82, Article 170, and Article 329(a) of the Indian Constitution. Those deliberations disclose a very complex interplay of legislative finality, judicial oversight, and democratic accountability.

A. Judicial Precedents and the Role of the Constitutional Courts

Interpretation of Articles 82, 170, and particularly delimitation under Article 329(a) raises a host of constitutional challenges. These are the broad paradigms set for each delimitation in India: periodic adjustments of constituencies due to growth in population and limiting judicial review simultaneously so that the work gets continuous. The first major challenge had arisen in context of Article 329(a), which bars judicial review after the order of delimitation has been published. The purpose behind this Article is to avoid possible electoral delays but it is criticized for denying citizens a forum to redress their complaints that may have arisen from decisions on several delimitations.

The courts have been at the centre of most of the delimitation-related disputes, especially in taking into consideration the constitutional bar on judicial review under Article 329(a). One such example is that of the landmark case of Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission, which upheld the restraint of the judiciary in delimitation matters. The plaintiff in this case challenged the reservation of the Ujjain parliamentary constituency for Scheduled Castes on the ground that it did not ensure fair representation. The Supreme Court held that Article 329(a) ousted the jurisdiction of the courts in interfering in any matters once the orders of the commission are published. The principle that this judgment showcased is the principle of legislative supremacy in regard to electoral processes by stating that any intervention by the judiciary could derail the process of holding elections at their due time.

Another case was that of Election Commission of India v. Md. Abdul Ghani, which has further strengthened the inviolability of delimitation orders. This time, the Supreme Court’s judgment was against a directive of the High Court to change the boundaries of a constituency to include 16 mouzas, falling under another constituency, using the powers of the Election Commission. The Court pointed out that every alteration that is made in the constituency due to delimitation, then that will be a matter of the Commission, and it would be out of the courts’ jurisdiction. This judgment further entrenched the idea that delimitation, being a legislative and quasi-judicial process, should remain insulated from judicial interference.

However, especially noteworthy is the significant change in the stand of the Supreme Court over the years, which thus reflects the changed contours of constitutional jurisprudence. The Supreme Court judgment in the case of Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India, held that the scope of judicial review could be wide. It went on to hold that there is a limitation on this exercise of power of judicial review under Article 329(a), though the same does not entirely oust the jurisdiction of the courts. The Court went on to clarify that in cases of manifest arbitrariness and mala fide actions, or even constitutional violations, judicial intervention would be permissible. This judgment of the Supreme Court is supported by another Supreme Court’s judgement in the case of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. State of T.N, where the court interpreted Articles 243O and 243ZG of the Constitution vis-à-vis Article 329. The Kishorchandra case is a significant judgment and departures significantly from earlier precedents and shows a growing concern of the judiciary in ensuring accountability within the delimitation process.

The judiciary went beyond national boundaries to international precedents to back its own interpretations. In that respect, the Court considered cases such as Shaw v. Reno which addressed the racial gerrymandering which refers to the deliberate attempt by political parties to favour them in specific constituencies, and R v. Boundary Commission for England, in which the court was allowed for reviewing delimitation in case of arbitrariness being alleged. These cases underline that it is only through judicial review that abuses of power in demarcation of electoral boundaries can be checked. 

Another significant role of the judiciary in the interpretative process has been the laying down of guidelines of intervention. In Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar, the court interpreted Articles 329 and 324 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court laid a two-stage tests for judicial review: “(i) the order sought from the Court did not have the effect of retarding, interrupting, protracting or stalling the counting of votes and the declaration of the results, (ii) a clear case of mala fides on the part of Election Commission inviting intervention of the Court was made out, that being the only ground taken in the petition.” This ensures that judicial intervention will take place cautiously without altering the scheduled elections.

The constitutional challenges and legal debates form a dynamic interplay among the intent of the legislature, judicial review, and ideas of democracy. While in the past, the judiciary consistently deferred to the Delimitation Commission, the recent cases do suggest that it is moving—albeit slowly—towards greater accountability and transparency. The courts have, following a midway course, assumed the duty to reassert their relevance as upholder of constitutional values in a manner that assures the delimitation process to be fair, inclusive, and reflective of India’s democratic aspirations—it is very balanced. Now, as the freeze on delimitation is coming to an end in 2026, these debates certainly will shape the future of India’s electoral framework.

II. Future Implications and Reform Proposals

The delimitation exercise in 2026 will be one such critical juncture in the democratic progression of India. It is the freeze that created imbalances of profound orders for representation and impinges upon questions of equity and federal stability that were supposed to be incumbent on the constitution. India will have to both correct the cascading impacts of its present delimitation system and, at the same time, look for transformative reforms on how to protect and sustain the integrity of its democracy. 

This section of the paper delves into the problems that confront the existing delimitation process, analysing negative of the delimitation freeze, and postulates detailed, actionable suggestions for reform in the future.

A. Problems in the Current Delimitation Procedure

A process, though deeply rooted with constitutional provisions, Articles 82 and 170, continually faces systemic flaws that do not go in favor of achieving its objectives. The delimitation freeze is identified to be the most substantial structural anomaly where demographic realities are disconnected from their political representation.

Basing the 1971 census data for constituency allocation turns out to be the most glaring problem of this entire framework. In this framework, high-growth states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, whose populations have grown exponentially, are most penalised because their average constituency represents over 2.5 million people. In comparison, southern stable-growth states, like Kerala, end up with constituencies that represent an average of 1.8 million people. The high dilution of impact of vote with respect to a high-growth state is, therefore, against the principle of “one person, one vote”. The urbanisation factor further complicates it, fast-growing metropolitan areas, like that of Delhi and Mumbai, come under the constituencies where people are large in number and thus the demography is complex; hence, they place a very high demand on their representatives. The Outer Delhi constituency today represents above 3 million people, while constituencies in rural parts of Himachal Pradesh or the Northeast, are often below 8,00,000. This gap between urban and rural is deepening the inefficiencies in governance, as the urban constituencies are not able to cater to all the diverse needs of their residents.

B. Proposed Reforms to Address Delimitation Challenges

The delimitation challenges cannot be dealt with unless there is a full-scale rethinking of the framework and reforms which is based on the principles of equity, transparency, and federal balance. 

A more pressing reform is in the revisiting of the criteria for seat allocations. Population is a factor, but an equal weight should be given to the contributions that each state makes, in terms of GDP, literacy rates, and implementation of national policies on population control. This will mean that states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu are not unduly penalized in any seat allocations, as their socio-economic indicators are quite high.

Urban representation must be synchronized with the accelerated urbanization. Great metropolitan constituencies may have to be carved out into much smaller units to have a fair share of representation for urban voters. For instance, the existing Outer Delhi constituency can be split into two or three constituencies so that local problems and governance can be given more attention. Further, the pressure on parliamentary members could be waived off by having urban legislative councils with powers especially carved out for addressing problems unique to cities.

Another area crying out for reform is that of judicial accountability in the delimitation process. Although Article 329(a) was to protect the integrity of the electoral timeline, there exists a need to insert a provision that a judicial review shall lay down in cases of manifest arbitrariness or violation of the Constitution. There should exist a limited power of oversight so that the delimitation process becomes more transparent without damaging the process of efficiency. Therefore, the appointment of independent review panels or citizen commissions to scrutinize the decisions of the Delimitation Commission on its final proposals would make it more accountable. 

One critical reform that will have to be carried out is to increase the number of seats in both Houses of Parliament and the legislatures of the states. This is imperative, in view of the increase in population—without at the same time diluting the relative weight of votes of any state. It is only by increasing the size of the two legislative bodies that no part of the country would be under-represented, thus maintaining cooperative federalism. However, it should be coupled with clear and unambiguous criteria for the distribution of seats so no further imbalances are created. 

Finally, the exercise of delimitation should involve the public more. The Delimitation Commission will have to work in a consultative manner, involving the public through consultation and detailed reports on methodology. The only way this process can be made meaningful is with transparency that instils faith and at the same time ensures that stakeholders also believe that they are being reflected in the process. 

III. Conclusion

The policy of constituency freeze initiated was one of the farthest-reaching policy choices for electoral history in India. The statement of purpose behind the freeze was much simpler: it was required in that point of time to stabilize representation amid variable rates of regional population growth. However, as it has turned out in the decades since its original implementation, the implications for this freeze are much more far-reaching for the principles of representative democracy and electoral equality.

The freeze has further widened the gap in representation between the urban and rural sectors. Rapid urbanization has led to populous urban constituencies in the metropolitan cities – Mumbai, Delhi, and Bengaluru, among others, where elected representatives are expected to look after the interests of millions. Conversely, rural constituencies that relate to much smaller and more diffused populations seem to offer a disproportionate political representation. This poor representation of the urban areas has serious ramifications for governance and resource allocation, as often such economic powerhouses miss out on the funds, they need for infrastructure and development.

The most contentious fall out of this freeze, however, has been the regional disparities, especially between the southern states and their northern counterparts. Indeed, south Indian states have maintained their share quite effectively and seem to have contributed significantly towards controlling their population growth, even greater than northern India, thus continuing to have a higher proportional representation as compared to their numbers in the country. However, the rising factor of dismay amongst greater-populated northern states is about this increasing sense of political inequity. This regional skew is bound to seriously sabotage the fragile spirit of cooperative federalism, as states on lower representations often find it difficult to secure a just distribution of resources and policy priority.

The success in the delimitation exercise of 2026 will certainly define the future of the electoral system and add to their long desire for fairness, equity, and inclusivity of India. This conundrum of demographic proportionality vs. Federal stability underlies one of the most important and excruciating tasks. Despite having helped in many respects as a stabilizing measure, the constituency freeze has gone on to freeze the disparities in India’s democratic framework. In that sense, going ahead provide an opportunity to correct and reform past distortions that may truly reflect an aspiration of the larger populace. Reforming the electoral system according to the needs of the present and the future would be supportive to democratic institutions in accordance with the basic building block of a representative democracy.

** Basil is a Final Year B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) student at National Law University, Jodhpur. He is deeply passionate about engaging with contemporary legal issues and developments across a broad spectrum of legal fields. Through research and academic writing, He explore the intersections of various areas of law and aim to use writing as a tool to enhance legal understanding and promote dialogue within the academic and professional legal communities.

**Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog do not necessarily align with the views of the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.