Reconciling the National Sports Governance Act with International Sports Arbitration
**Param
The National Sports Governance Act (hereinafter, ‘the Act’) was enacted on, bringing a systematic overhaul to the governance of sports in India. One of the most significant features of the act is the introduction of new mechanisms for dispute resolution in national sports. This includes establishing a National Sports Tribunal (hereinafter, Tribunal) and, in certain cases, direct appeals to the Court of Arbitration of Sport (hereinafter CAS) in Switzerland.
India’s engagement with international sports governance has historically been marked by tension between domestic regulatory control and the autonomy claimed by international federations. (See, for instance, bans on Indian AIFA, AKFI, WFI by International organisations.) In this context, any restructuring of dispute resolution mechanisms raises an immediate concern: could domestic intervention invite allegations of non-compliance with international sporting norms? The introduction of a National Sports Tribunal and conditional appeals to the Supreme Court has therefore prompted apprehension that India may be creating parallel hierarchies in conflict with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). This post argues that such concerns are overstated. Properly understood, the Act embeds domestic adjudication within the existing transnational framework rather than disrupting it.
Dispute Resolution under the National Sports Governance Act
The dispute resolution under the act is governed by Chapter IX. Section 17 of the Act provides for the constitution of a National Sports Tribunal ‘to provide for the independent, speedy, effective and cost-efficient disposal of sports-related disputes.’
Section 20 is another important provision in this regard, which defines the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Under Section 20, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over disputes that either arise during games Olympic Games, Paralympic Games, Commonwealth Games, Asian Games, or any other similar events organised by any International Federations or which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of other national and international dispute resolution bodies, including the internal dispute resolution committee of a sports body and CAS.
Section 22 provides for the transfer of all the pending cases of civil jurisdiction falling within the scope of this Act, in which the National Sports Bodies are impleaded as parties to the tribunal. Section 23 creates a bar on civil courts from entertaining any further such cases, whereas Section 24 grants the Tribunal some powers similar to those of a civil court. Section 25 is an appeals provision that allows appeals from the Tribunal’s orders to the Supreme Court, unless the International Charters and Statutes provide for an appeal to the CAS.
From this scheme, one can deduce the act’s dispute resolution mechanism as follows. An aggrieved athlete (or a party) can file a case directly with the Tribunal against a National Sport Body, unless barred by section 20. The Tribunal can then assume powers similar to those of a civil court to adjudicate the dispute. The aggrieved athlete (party) can appeal from such an order either to CAS or to the Supreme Court within the prescribed time limit.
Dispute Resolution under the International Sports Law Framework
International sports law does not operate as public international law between States. Rather, it functions as a transnational private regulatory order built on contractual consent. Athletes, national federations, and international federations are bound through statutes, membership agreements, and competition regulations. Dispute resolution within this framework, therefore, derives its authority from contractual incorporation rather than sovereign legislation.
Within this structure, disputes are generally resolved through two interconnected layers.
First, each international federation has its own regulatory and disciplinary framework. For instance, FIFA governs football through its Statute and Disciplinary Code, while World Athletics administers athletics under its own Competition and Integrity Rules. These instruments regulate matters such as eligibility, disciplinary sanctions, anti-doping violations, transfer disputes, and field-of-play controversies. Disputes arising directly under these rules are initially handled by internal judicial or disciplinary bodies constituted by the federation and are further appealable to CAS.
These internal bodies function as the first instance within the sporting regulatory structure. Federation statutes typically provide appellate mechanisms within the organisation, ensuring that disputes are addressed internally before any external review is sought. This reflects the principle of autonomy that characterises international sports governance: disputes are first resolved within the normative framework that gave rise to them.
The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) constitutes the apex appellate body within this transnational structure. Proceedings before CAS are governed by the CAS Code. Article R47 establishes two jurisdictional preconditions for its appellate jurisdictions: (1) the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, and (2) exhaustion of the legal remedies available within the relevant federation before appeal. The exhaustion requirement reflects the principle that disputes must first be addressed within the regulatory system that generated them.
The arbitration agreement requirement is ordinarily satisfied because federation statutes explicitly incorporate CAS as the final appellate body. By participating in competitions or affiliating with a federation, athletes and national bodies contractually accept this dispute resolution structure. For example, the FIFA Statutes expressly provide for appeals to CAS.
The exhaustion requirement ensures that CAS does not ordinarily function as a court of first instance. A party must first pursue the remedies provided under the applicable federation regulations before approaching CAS. Only after those internal avenues are exhausted may CAS assume jurisdiction. CAS therefore operates as the final appellate body within the structured dispute-resolution hierarchy created by sporting statutes.
Reconciling the National Sports Act with the International Sports Law framework
Once international sports law is understood as a hierarchical, contract-based regulatory order culminating in CAS review, the perceived conflict with the Act becomes significantly less persuasive. The Act does not insert a parallel sovereign adjudicatory regime into that structure. Rather, it regulates the domestic segment of the dispute-resolution chain in a manner that is structurally aligned with the sequencing logic already embedded in international sports arbitration.
The first point of compatibility is Section 20, which ensures there is no jurisdictional overlap. Section 20 expressly excludes from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction disputes arising during major international events and those falling within the exclusive domain of international dispute-resolution bodies, including CAS. This carve-out prevents the Tribunal from intruding into matters that federal statutes reserve to the federation’s internal bodies or to CAS itself. Where international regulations establish a defined adjudicatory pathway culminating in CAS, that pathway remains untouched. The Tribunal cannot reopen, re-evaluate, or override determinations structurally embedded within the international sporting framework.
The second point of reconciliation lies in Section 25, which preserves appeals to CAS wherever international charters or statutes so provide. On its face, the provision allowing appeals to the Supreme Court may appear to introduce tension. However, that impression dissolves once Section 25 is read in light of the jurisdictional logic already discussed.
Section 25(1) provides: ‘Unless the International Charters and Statutes provide for appeal before the Court of Arbitration for Sport, an appeal shall lie against any order of the Tribunal, not being an interlocutory order, to the Supreme Court.’
The key of interpretation lies in the opening word ‘Unless.’ The Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is expressly made conditional upon the absence of a CAS appellate clause in the relevant International Charters and Statutes. Both conclusions that follow flow directly from this conditional formulation.
First, CAS jurisdiction depends upon the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, ordinarily contained in the statutes of the relevant international federation. If those statutes do not provide for an appeal to CAS, the foundational requirement for CAS jurisdiction is not satisfied. In such cases, CAS cannot assume appellate authority. Section 25, therefore, does not divert disputes away from CAS; it operates only where CAS jurisdiction does not arise in the first place. Conversely, where federation statutes incorporate CAS as the final appellate authority, Section 25 expressly preserves that route. The Tribunal’s decision will then be appealable to CAS, not to the Supreme Court, because the statutory text excludes Supreme Court jurisdiction where the International Charters and Statutes provide otherwise.
Second, Section 25 establishes an either-or appellate structure. The words ‘Unless … provide for appeal before the Court of Arbitration for Sport’ indicate that only one appellate forum can be triggered in a given case. A matter proceeds either to CAS (where mandated by the relevant sporting statute) or to the Supreme Court (where no such mandate exists). There is no concurrent appellate review by both bodies over the same dispute. This eliminates duplicity and preserves clarity in appellate sequencing, since the statutory language itself directs the appeal to a single forum while excluding the other.
The availability of Supreme Court review in residual cases does not undermine international sports arbitration. CAS awards are subject to limited scrutiny by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court on narrow grounds, such as procedural fairness or a violation of public policy. Similarly, CAS awards are also subject to review by EU courts on public policy grounds post the judgment in RFC Seraing. International sports adjudication, therefore, already operates within a framework of bounded judicial oversight. The Act’s provision for Supreme Court review in non-CAS matters reflects a comparable structural balance. Sporting autonomy is respected where federation statutes require it; domestic judicial review remains available where disputes implicate statutory governance, labour law, or broader legal guarantees under Indian law.
Taken together, Sections 20 and 25 allocate jurisdiction along principled lines. Section 20 prevents encroachment into matters reserved for international adjudication. Section 25 ensures that CAS retains appellate authority wherever federation statutes incorporate it, while the Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction only in cases where CAS jurisdiction is absent. The result is conditional sequencing rather than competing hierarchies. The Act therefore integrates the domestic dispute-resolution layer into the existing transnational framework without generating institutional conflict.
From a policy perspective, this architecture achieves two objectives simultaneously. It centralises sports litigation within a specialised domestic forum, reducing fragmentation and forum shopping within India, while preserving India’s compliance with the dispute-resolution commitments embedded in international federation statutes. By clearly demarcating when CAS jurisdiction applies and when domestic appellate review governs, the Act reduces uncertainty for athletes and federations alike. Rather than risking international friction, it strengthens India’s institutional credibility by demonstrating that domestic accountability can coexist with transnational sporting autonomy.
Conclusion
The National Sports Governance Act does not create an institutional conflict with international sports law. The apparent duplication in dispute resolution pathways is resolved through jurisdictional carve-outs, subject-matter differentiation, and conditional appellate routes. Section 20 prevents interference with international event-related disputes. Section 25 preserves appeals to CAS where mandated by international statutes. The Tribunal functions as a domestic exhaustion mechanism rather than as a rival authority to CAS.
The Act clarifies and consolidates domestic disputes within a specialised tribunal while respecting the hierarchical authority of CAS in matters governed by international federation rules. The result is not institutional competition but institutional sequencing.
The Act, therefore, represents an effort to integrate India more coherently into the transnational sports governance framework. It affirms domestic accountability without disturbing the contractual autonomy of international sports bodies. Properly understood, the dispute-resolution mechanism reflects coordination between legal orders rather than conflict between them.
**Param is a III-year law student at NALSAR University of Law
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog do not necessarily align with the views of the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.