From Grassroots to Global

Assessing the Centralizing Grip of India’s New Sports Legislation

**Lovish J Goyal

The provisions of the National Sports Governance Act, 2025 (“the Act”), were recently notified by the Union Government primarily to provide for the regulation of sports in India. Pertinently, while this act has been enacted by the Union Government, the power to enact laws pertaining to sports has been granted to states under Entry 33 of List II.  Because of this, the Union has used alternate avenues to enact the legislation in the form of the mandate under Article 253 of the Indian Constitution, that allows the Parliament to legislate on state subjects to implement international treaties or conventions. Furthermore, the Delhi High Court in the case of Indian Olympic Association v. Union of India (“Indian Olympic Association”) has previously acknowledged that the Union has the power to legislate for national and international level sports under the residuary entry under Entry 97 of List I. 

However, this article argues that even the avenues mentioned above do not confer the Union to legislate the Act. The Act extends its reach beyond the international and national representation to district and state level sports and exceeds the mandate of Article 253 and the decision in the case of Indian Olympic Association. The article further argues that the Act represents a significant overreach of federal authority and seeks to govern a subject matter exclusively reserved for states.

Provisions of the Act and their stated objectives

The Act establishes a centralised regulatory architecture designed to govern sports from the grassroots to the international level. Section 5 of the Act provides for the establishment of the National Sports Board (“the Board”) which heads this architecture. Section 6 of the Act vests the Board with the power of granting recognition to sports organisations and maintaining a comprehensive register of National Sports Bodies (“NSB(s)”) and their respective affiliate units at the State and District levels. Section 6 also empowers the Board to conduct inquiries into the misuse of public funds or matters affecting athlete welfare and can suspend or cancel recognition of the sports bodies for gross irregularities or failures to hold democratic elections.

Further, Section 16 of the Act mandates the creation of the National Sports Election Panel to oversee free and fair elections to the Executive and Athletes Committees of NSBs. It also requires the NSBs to formulate a code of ethics and adhere to a safe sports policy framed by the Board to protect women and minor athletes from abuse. For the dispute resolution, Section 17 of the Act constitutes the National Sports Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) and Section 23 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of civil courts over matters within the Tribunal’s purview.

Furthermore, Section 14 of the Act stipulates that only recognised sports organisations are eligible to receive grants or financial assistance from the Union Government. Section 27(1) of the Act restricts the use of words like ‘India’, ‘Indian’, or ‘National’ in any organization’s name or logo without a no-objection certificate. Section 27(1) of the Act also provides that no sports organisation shall host any tournament if their registration has been suspended or cancelled by the Board. Crucially, Section 27(3) of the Act prohibits any person or group from representing a State or District in designated sports without authorisation from a recognised NSB.

Competence to legislate the Act

As mentioned earlier, the possible avenues for the Parliament to derive its competence to legislate the Act are either Article 253 of the Indian Constitution or the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Indian Olympic Association. Article 253 allows the Parliament to legislate laws to give effect to the provisions of international treaties or conventions. It has been recognised by the Bombay High Court in the case of P.B. Samant v. Union of India, that by virtue of Article 253, the Union gets the power to enact even on the subject matters enlisted in the State List. 

The Act’s preamble states its intention to align with the principles envisaged by the Olympic Charter and Paralympic Charter. The Olympic Charter imposes obligations on the National Olympic Committees (“NOCs”) to ensure the integrity of the Olympic movement. Rule 27 of the Olympic Charter required NOCs to perform several functions. These functions include the creation of a fair, transparent, and merit-based selection criteria to select and enter athletes for the Olympic Games. The Charter also requires the establishment of an Athletes’ Commission to ensure that the voices of sportspersons are represented in decision-making processes.

Furthermore, the Charter imposes strict ethical and social obligations. It requires NOCs to adopt and implement the World Anti-Doping Code and the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions. In recent years, these obligations have expanded to include specific mandates for gender equality, requiring sports bodies to encourage and support the promotion of women in sport at all levels to close the gender gap both on and off the field.

The Delhi High Court in the case of Indian Olympic Association has also held that the Union is competent to legislate on matters relating to national and international sports. The Court reasoned that when a body or athlete represents India, it is discharging a function of significant national importance that transcends state boundaries. Consequently, the Court held that the Union possesses the legislative competence to coordinate sports nationwide under its residuary powers under Article 248 of the Constitution read with Entry 97 of List I and its powers over Foreign Affairs under Entries 10 and 13 of List I). 

Encroachment on the state list

However, even if the Act is said to trace its power from Article 253 or from the decision in the Indian Olympic Association, the Act would still go beyond the competence of the Union to enact laws. The provisions of the Act go beyond the obligations cast by the concerned international conventions. Furthermore, the Act also goes beyond the power contemplated by the court in Indian Olympic Association. 

While the Olympic and Paralympic Charters primarily concern themselves with the integrity, anti-doping compliance, and democratic selection processes of NOCs to ensure they are fit for international participation, the Act provides for provisions which go far beyond these requirements. For instance, provisions such as obtaining a non-objection certificate before using the Indian insignia in its registered name come in direct contradiction with the fact that district or state sports organisations work at local levels and do not have international ramifications for the country. Furthermore, it creates a central chokehold over grassroots representation by prohibiting any individual or group from representing even a District or a State in designated sports without the express authorisation of a Union recognised National Sports Body. This requirement moves far beyond the obligations of the Olympic and the Paralympic Charter.

This underscores a lack of proximate nexus between the required international obligations and the scope of the Act. Article 253 and the decision in the case of Indian Olympic Association vest the Union with the power to legislate on the conduct of the sports at national and Olympic events, this power does not naturally extend to a state-level wrestling trial or a district football tournament. The Constitution envisages that the State has the default power to enact on such district or state level trials and tournaments. However, the Act transforms an international participation requirement for global games into a domestic governance mandate for local level sports by regulating these inherently localised activities. These district or state level sports are not merely preparatory stages for national and international level sports. For instance, Odisha has significantly redefined its global image by becoming a hub for hockey, investing thousands of crores to host international championships. Similarly, Punjab utilises sports as a critical recreational measure to combat its persistent drug menace, channelling youth energy into village level athletics as a form of social rehabilitation. These localised sports activities serve further purposes for the states and they should have the autonomy and flexibility to utilise these activities as they deem beneficial for the state.

Similarly, the court in the Indian Olympic Association merely reads the power to enact laws on national and international level sports through the residuary power entry in the Union List. However, the Act also seeks to regulate local level sports, which go beyond the power contemplated by the court in Indian Olympic Association.

Therefore, the Act cannot be said to trace its power from either Article 253 or from the decision in Indian Olympic Association. Article 253 was intended to ensure India fulfils its global commitments, its application to justify provisions of the Act which go beyond the mandate of the Olympic Charter can lead to utilisation of international charters as a jurisdictional hook to legislate on subjects reserved for States. This can lead to a creation of a constitutional loophole. It is widely recognised that international conventions are increasingly being drawn up for diverse subjects ranging from environmental standards and health protocols to labour rights and digital governance. If the mere existence of a treaty or a decision at an international conference allows Parliament to enact extensively on that subject matter without assessing the limitations of the treaty itself, the State List risks becoming entirely infructuous. 

Furthermore, the decision in Indian Olympic Association had read the power to enact on national or international sports while holding that these subject matters have implications for the nation as a whole. However, the mandate of the Act to govern even local level sports tends to ignore this underlying rationale behind the decision in Indian Olympic Association. 

Furthermore, historically, central sports funding has already shown a troubling lack of parity. Reports have highlighted that states like Gujarat have received significantly higher allocations often exceeding ₹600 crore while states in South India, such as Tamil Nadu and Kerala, are granted mere fractions of that amount. These reports of disparity provide a chilling context for the Act which formalises the Union’s power to use financial leverage as a tool of coercion. Furthermore, by requiring central authorisation for local trials and state level representation under Section 27, the Act risks the recognition process becoming a filter for central preference.

Conclusion

The Act represents a significant overreach of federal authority. By extending its regulatory reach to district and state-level sports, the Act transcends the limited mandates of Article 253 and the Indian Olympic Association precedent. 

In Canada, the National Sports Policy restricts federal intervention to elite national team programs and international competitions, leaving territorial management to Provincial Governments. This model reinforces the argument that national-level representation and regional sports administration are distinct functions and not necessarily incidental to one another. Furthermore, Section 7(1)(p) of the Australian Sports Commission Act 1989 provides consultation and co-operation with States and Territory authorities as one of the functions of the National Sports Commission. Whereas the Act provides for an absolute top-down approach.

India should consider restoring the power to regulate local level sports to the States. By adopting a similar tiered approach, the Union can fulfill its Olympic Charter obligations through national leadership while preserving the constitutional autonomy of States to manage the grassroots programs essential for local social policy and public health.

**Lovish J Goyal is a third year law student at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog do not necessarily align with the views of the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.