Disinformation as Coercion

**Vishwaroop Chatterjee 

Introduction

“If you are good at disinformation, you can get away with anything,” is one of the opening statements in the KGB manual. Indeed, these statements still hold true today.

The advent of emerging technologies has accelerated the application of disinformation methods. Previously, just a few radio or television stations had authority over the narratives. But now, any state citizen or numerous media sources are participating in an information war. Not to mention that disinformation has been spread by both state and non-state actors.

The recent border tensions between India and Pakistan witnessed unprecedented levels of disinformation, with both state and non-state actors engaging in an intensive disinformation campaign. The repercussions of such a disinformation campaign are as follows: first, it undermines democratic values; second, it distorts individuals’ perception of reality, infringing on their right to truth; and third, it may violate international law norms.

In this blog, the author will examine India and Pakistan’s recent disinformation engagement, as well as the fundamental challenges that arise from disinformation affecting civilians. The blog shall deal with questions on how states deploy false narratives to influence perception, the role of modern technologies, and gaps in international regulatory factors. The author shall delve into treaties, conventions, and real-world examples to help minimise curbing of government takedowns and propose a stronger international response to disinformation. 

The Disinformation Battle: India v. Pakistan 

On May 9, India’s Ministry of Defence issued advice via its official X handle, requesting media outlets, internet platforms, and individuals to avoid live or real-time reporting on defense operations and security forces activities. Around the same time, the Press Information Bureau (PIB) emphasised the significance of sharing only official advisories, helplines, and verified updates to counteract fake news. 

Pakistan led an aggressive disinformation campaign with claims such as destroying India’s air bases, India attacking its own cities, or even destroying India’s S-400 defense systems. Tensions intensified as Pakistani leaders and prominent figures began to celebrate the ceasefire as a phantom success and claim they won the war. However, officials have confirmed that a ceasefire truce was requested by Pakistan’s government, giving the claim of victory less legitimacy. 

However, Indian media channels followed up on the disinformation. The majority of news outlets thrive on providing hyper-nationalistic information rather than effective news. Some of the unreliable assertions include the Indian Navy demolishing Karachi Port, a massive coup in Pakistan, and the purported arrest of Pakistan’s Army Chief.

This exchange of disinformation highlights regulatory gaps in the current international law landscape. Disinformation is not only a threat to the right to information, but it can also be a significant ground for the instigation of war. In the case of The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, the concept of instigation was defined as urging or encouraging another party to commit an act of crime, as well as establishing a direct relation to the crime or at least having a contributing factor to the act. The pertinent analysis may apply to the media houses that encourage the instigation of war with hyper-nationalist or war-mongering news coverage. 

International Law & Disinformation 

According to the International Court of Justice’s ruling in Nicaragua v. USA, the concept of non-intervention defends territory where sovereignty permits states to make their own decisions, but only in relation to “coercive” interventions. The outcome of disinformation may not have a direct impact, but in the long run, disinformation can lead to democratic muddle and domestic instability. 

While the Nicaraguan standard provides insights on indirect coercion, its application to coercion raises key challenges. In the present scenario, the Pakistani state’s claim to have won the war can create unrest in India and impeach its sovereignty by disinformation. Such narratives, if left unchecked, can fuel internal discord, provoke public outrage, and erode national unity.  

Individuals may dispute regarding which facts are correct or how important they are while making decisions. However, most prudent individuals believe they cannot make sound decisions based on incorrect information. Misleading someone with false facts is a type of coercion since it restricts their freedom by making some options appear impossible while others feel necessary. Dr.Ilias Plakokefalos puts forward the idea that one must establish a cause-and-effect relation to establish coercion. In the present context, the news outlets spreading disinformation regarding destruction of critical infrastructure to nuclear attack threats can have irreparable damage to a state. 

For example, if state X’s media sources continue to propagate false information that the state has won the war against state Y by attacking their critical infrastructure, (1) State X’s citizens will celebrate a deceptive win and increase their war mongering proclivities. (2) State Y is agitated by lies, and its citizens demand more severe actions against State X. (3) State X and State Y are engaged in long-term disinformation activities, and their citizens continue to demand unreasonable and fatal consequences for the other state.

However, as Graham T. Allison puts it in the book Destined for War, “The complexity of causation in human affairs has vexed philosophers, jurists, and social scientists.”  The act of causation of severe acts of violence being directly linked to new outlets shall be a challenging task. Determining the particular motivations of disinformation and locating the exact causative factors driving severe attacks is often tricky and subjective. 

On the other hand, the 1936 International Convention on the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace comes in handy as article 3 of the convention details that States must promptly stop knowingly false broadcasts harming international understanding. 

The convention addresses the threshold of coerciveness and the attribution of private actors’ conduct, both of which would render the non-intervention principle inapplicable to fake news. First, state parties must ensure that the concept applies to both public and private broadcasters in conformity with Article 6. Second, broadcasts are not required to be coercive to violate the convention. Article 4 of the Broadcasting Convention provides a duty of due diligence to ensure that broadcasters convey information about international relations with credibility, particularly during emergencies. 

According to Article 8 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), news corporations can be held accountable in certain situations. False news that violates the principle of non-intervention may result in restitution and satisfaction under Articles 35 and 37 of ARSIWA. 

While an argument in favor of disinformation can be made is that it is a legitimate “ruse of war” which is acceptable under International Law. Ruses of war have existed and been employed in combat throughout humanity’s history of armed conflict, such as the Trojan Horse or Operation Fortitude. The consensus has emerged that any conduct that violates any rule of warfare in international law cannot be justified as a permissible ruse of war. This consensus served as the foundation for the notion of ruses of war outlined in Article 37(2) of the Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I (1977). Moreover, disinformation, along with violence, can lead to long-term mental health concerns and encourage extremism and extremist attitudes. These approaches endanger civilian lives, weaken confidence in humanitarian organizations, complicate relief efforts, and jeopardize the delivery of life-saving aid and safe passage.  

Another argument could perhaps be that the regulation of information on the name of disinformation can lead to unprecedented takedowns. For example, India’s decision to prohibit everything in response to the disinformation was equally dubious. Over 8000 accounts on X, Pakistani figures’ social media accounts, and several national and international news channels were taken down. In addition to undermining fundamental rights, this precedent demonstrates the system’s regulatory flaws and the ineffectiveness of the harboring concept.

However, the key issue is presented as disinformation is not always illegal. E.g.: During the India-Pak conflict, Chinese Media allegedly circulated one-sided information supporting Pakistan’s claims; however, since the content wasn’t legally unlawful, it was unclear what X’s legal obligations were. 

The Way Forward 

The first thing to address shall be the over-regulation of content online in order to combat disinformation. The Indian approach to censoring content online and the lack of a compliance directive for the intermediaries have caused a great conundrum. Hence, the first suggestion is to use labels on social media instead of direct takedowns. Labels can be applied to individual posts or to a social media account (for instance, identifying if the post is a parody or state-sponsored). 

Posts that disseminate disinformation can benefit from label-specific material.  A post that contains incorrect information, for instance, can be easily classified as unreliable, disputed, out-of-date, or can be labeled with facts that prove it false. This can reduce litigation and instill education in public rather than arbitrary regulation of information by the state. 

The second suggestion lies with the algorithm moderation of the content. Political leaders and traditional media will have more opportunities to spread disinformation and act and speak in polarizing ways when algorithms magnify false and controversial content online.

Modifications to curation algorithms may be able to mitigate the issue, or at the very least, reduce the platforms’ contributions to disinformation, if those algorithms contribute to its spread.  Platforms could achieve this by increasing the use of algorithms to detect and remove or limit specific types of content in order to reduce their prevalence. 

Dr.James Pamment puts forward the idea that building trust among stakeholders has been impeded by the notion that tech platforms are somehow the problem themselves and that legislation may resolve this issue. Threat actors that want to misuse the platforms of which the platforms are also victims are the true issue. Thus, working with platforms and stakeholders shall provide a holistic approach to combating disinformation.

The third suggestion is to form a working body under the United Nations Department of Peace Operations to create a dedicated disinformation unit modeled after efforts like the EUvDisinfo to monitor and assess harmful disinformation, particularly during emergencies or armed conflict.

An international disinformation countering unit should act as a neutral third-party body to verify facts, especially during crises involving nuclear threats, civilian attacks, or ethnic provocations. Its objective mechanisms must include real-time monitoring, independent fact-checking, transparent reporting, and cooperation with states and platforms to prevent escalation, ensure accountability, and uphold peace, security, and accurate public discourse.

Its legal foundation can originate from Article 19 of the ICCPR, which allows restrictions on expression to protect national security and public order, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which prohibits actions that endanger civilians, and the Rome Statute, which criminalizes incitement to genocide or war crimes through false information. Articles 8, 35, and 37 of ARSIWA restrict attribution of disinformation by states and require remedies.

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the integrity of society and peace are seriously threatened by disinformation, whether it is spread by state or non-state actors. Although it was once thought to be a legitimate “ruse of war,” contemporary disinformation blurs the line between reality and fiction due to online bots, AI manipulation, or algorithms that aggravate the situation. Current international legal frameworks like the 1936 Broadcasting Convention and ARSIWA provide means to address these problems and shall be implemented under new initiatives to tackle disinformation.

Rather, a more balanced approach between security and freedom of expression might be achieved through proportionate measures like content labeling, algorithmic reform, and the development of specific UN measures (modeled after EUvDisinfo). In the end, any effective strategy must uphold civil freedoms, encourage openness, and create unambiguous international norms to combat disinformation while defending democratic and humanitarian principles.

**Vishwaroop Chatterjee is an undergraduate student at the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law. His academic interests lie primarily in technology law and constitutional law. Special Thanks to his friend Inika Dular.

**Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog do not necessarily align with the views of the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.