An Analysis of the Karnataka Fake News Bill

**Varun Pandey

Background

The Government of Karnataka has proposed a draft of the Karnataka Misinformation and Fake News Bill(2025) (“Draft Bill”) with the stated objective of curbing the proliferation of online disinformation. While the professed intent is to curb the menace of disinformation, the Draft Bill, in substance, introduces sweeping powers of censorship and criminalisation that raise profound constitutional concerns. The central legal issue is whether the Draft Bill can withstand scrutiny under Articles 19 and 14 of the Indian Constitution.

This article contends that the Draft Bill would not pass the test of constitutionality if it were to be made a law. It fails the test of reasonable restrictions under Article 19, violates the principle of proportionality, the vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine and places adjudicatory power in the hands of executive bodies, thereby infringing Article 14. Judicial precedents ranging from Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) to Kunal Kamra v. Union of India (2024) demonstrates that the Draft Bill suffers from defects of vagueness, overbreadth, arbitrariness, and absence of procedural safeguards.

The Contents of the Draft: What does it say?

Under the Draft Bill, any social media post may be subjected to prosecution, whether on the basis of a user complaint, platform report, or under the monitoring mandate of the Fake News Authority established under the draft bill, or a police complaint. Section 5 establishes a Fake News on Social Media Regulatory Authority, chaired by the State Information Minister, and confers upon it six broad powers under Section 6,to implement a “complete ban” on false news; to prevent “abusive, obscene, or anti-feminist” material; to stop material that “disrespects Sanatan symbols and beliefs;” To restrict posts that “promote superstition;” to urge criminal punishment under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and; to allow only “authentic research” on science, history, religion, philosophy, and literature.

Upon receiving a complaint, the police may register a non-bailable FIR under Section 3 of the draft Bill. Section 3(1) prohibits any person, whether inside or outside Karnataka, from communicating or abetting the communication of misinformation that is prejudicial to public health, safety, tranquility, or free and fair elections. Under Section 3(2), those who directly communicate such misinformation face two to five years’ imprisonment and a fine. Section 3(3) separately penalizes abetment, with punishment of up to two years’ imprisonment and a fine.Thereafter, the matter is to be heard by a Special Court constituted under Section 8. The Special Court may issue a “Correction Direction” under Section 13 (1), compelling platforms to publish an official correction, or a “Disabling Direction” under Section 13(2), preventing access to the impugned content in Karnataka pending trial. 

Aggrieved parties may ask the Special Court to alter or revoke these orders within 30 days, although trials proceed under Section 12’s strict bail limits. Further, the section provides that acquittals or convictions may be appealed only before the Karnataka High Court after sixty days. Simply stated, it transfers jurisdiction from an executive-led fact-checking jurisdiction to an executive-led police jurisdiction, which directs enforcement via Special Courts, and provides limited judicial review for anyone caught in its vast net.

Constitutional Violations and Judicial Precedents

The prohibitory criteria prescribed in the Draft Bill are articulated in terms that are both overbroad and indeterminate. Such drafting undermines legal certainty and fails to provide adequate guidance to citizens or regulators. For instance, “misinformation” is defined in Section 2(k) so expansively that it encompasses not only intentionally made false statements, but also the negligent dissemination of inaccurate facts. The definition, as worded, may even extend to omissions, satire, humour, or parody. Thus, minor factual errors or inadvertent reporting inaccuracies could be treated as criminal offences. Such drafting of the section obfuscates deliberate misinformation with genuine mistakes, thereby casting a chilling shadow over free expression.

Similarly, the phrase “fake news” as defined in Section 2(i) is equally broad, encompassing “misquotation, manipulated or altered media, or entirely fabricated content”. In the Shreya Singhal case (2015) the Supreme Court annulled Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 for imposing unreasonable restrictions on free speech. The Supreme Court held that the provision was excessively broad in scope and infringed upon individual rights beyond the constitutional limitations of Article 19(2).Thereby declaring the section unconstitutional due to overbreadth, as its terminology- “offensive,” “menacing”- was ambiguous and overly expansive, restricting even legitimate expression. Thus, the Court held that a statute that “establishes an offence that is vague and overbroad” is unconstitutional under Article 19(1)(a). 

The doctrinal test laid down in Shreya Singhal applies to the phrase “fake news”as it suffers from the same infirmities. Firstly, its indeterminacy leaves citizens uncertain as to whether satire, criticism, or even unintentional error might be construed as criminalised speech. Secondly, its expansive scope travels far beyond the specific heads of restriction under Article 19(2) (such as public order, defamation, or incitement), thereby criminalising forms of speech that are expressly protected under the constitution. Thirdly, much like Section 66A, this section equips the State with excessive discretion, creating a fertile ground for arbitrary censorship. Thus, under the analytical framework of Shreya Singhal, the statutory use of “fake news” is constitutionally vulnerable for overbreadth and vagueness, and any law predicated upon such a definition risks invalidation under Article 19(1)(a).

Section 3 of the proposed draft Bill forbids the dissemination of disinformation if such communication is detrimental to public health, public safety, public order, or the integrity of free and fair elections. These phrases are ambiguous and beyond the legally permissible justifications outlined in Article 19(2). Significantly, “public health” and “free and fair elections” are phrases which are not included among the justifications in Article 19(2) for restricting speech. Further terms such as “public safety” or “public tranquillity” are vague and ambiguous. Such ambiguous phrasing often encourages selective and arbitrary enforcement. The Authority’s mandate to regulate “anti-feminism” or “disrespect of Sanatan symbols and beliefs” exemplifies this concern. The Draft Bill further fails to delineate what constitutes an “anti-feminist” speech or what qualifies as “disrespect” towards religious symbols, ambiguous criteria that could potentially criminalise a wide range of public discourse. 

Further, in S. Rangarajan v. Jagjivan Ram(1989), the Supreme Court cautioned that the freedom of expression may only be curtailed where the circumstances arising from the speech are urgent and threaten communal interests. A vaguely articulated prohibition on “misinformation” does not meet this criterion, since it is not limited to instances of evident danger or rights violations. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab(1994),held that a statute is deemed unconstitutional for vagueness if its prohibitions lack an unambiguous definition, as ambiguous laws violate several significant principles. 

In the case of Chintaman Rao v. State Madhya Pradesh(1950), the Supreme Court invalidated a legislation for being too wide while holding that “the language used is sufficiently expansive to encompass restrictions both within and beyond the confines of constitutionally permissible legislative action impacting the right.” If its potential to be used for fulfilling unconstitutional objectives cannot be eliminated, it must be deemed entirely invalid. Similarly in State of Madras v. V.G. Row(1952), the Supreme Court opined that a “reasonable restriction” under Articles 19(2) to (6) must fulfil the criteria of proportionality, stating that “the nature of the right purportedly infringed, the fundamental purpose of the imposed restrictions, the magnitude and immediacy of the issue intended to be addressed, the disproportionate nature of the imposition, and the prevailing circumstances at the time, should all be considered in the judicial decision.” Therefore if a legislation prohibits an activity that significantly exceeds the limitations established by Article 19(2) based on a flimsy relationship, there is substantial justification to contend that the restriction is excessive.

The Draft Bill neither establishes the criteria for the degree of falsehood or injury required for a statement to qualify, nor does it distinguish between deliberate misinformation and unintentional inaccuracies. Thus, viewed against the precedents of Chintaman Rao and V.G. Row, the Draft Bill’s provisions not only lack proportionality but also extend beyond constitutionally sanctioned restrictions, thereby violating Article 19(1)(a). This combination of vagueness, overbreadth, and disproportionality renders the statute constitutionally vulnerable.

Recent Lessons

The Bombay High Court encountered the same dilemma while assessing the constitutionality of the 2023 amendment to the The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. The amendment established a fact-checking unit within the Union Government, which was tasked with identifying any “fake, false, or misleading” material on the Centre’s activities on social media platforms, and then taking action against the social media intermediary involved. This provision was challenged before the Bombay High Court in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India (2024), and the judgment relied on numerous historic judgments, including Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) and Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023), to emphasize the perils of ambiguous and extensively broad constraints on free expression. The Bombay High Court underscored that the terms “fake,” “false,” and “misleading” were not adequately defined, rendering the rule unreasonably vague and overbroad. This lack of clear definitions created a chilling effect on free speech, as intermediaries were compelled to engage in pre-emptive censorship to avoid potential liability. In contrast, under the draft Bill, mere dissemination of so-called fake news is punishable, even in the absence of demonstrable harm. This represents a significant departure from established constitutional doctrine, as articulated in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India (2024), where the Court held that mere falsity of speech, without a proximate nexus to harm or prejudice on enumerated constitutional grounds, cannot, by itself, justify restrictions on free expression.

The establishment of the unit by the Union Government was also challenged on the ground of bias under Article 14 of the Constitution. Justice Patel held that empowering the Union Government as the authority to determine the veracity of information concerning itself was inherently arbitrary, as it lacked safeguards against bias. By positioning the Government as adjudicator in its own cause, the Rule contravened the principle of nemo judex in causa sua a core tenet of natural justice the violation of which results in arbitrariness and an infringement Article 14. Similarly, the Draft Bill’s Social Media Regulatory Authority is vested with wide powers to restrict information while being constituted and controlled by the State Government itself. The absence of institutional safeguards against the abuse renders this structure constitutionally invalid.

Conclusion

The Draft Bill, introduced with the ostensible goal of protecting public order and curbing disinformation, fails the constitutional tests as upheld by the court through its judgments. While it is reasonable to acknowledge the state’s efforts to enact laws prohibiting hate speech and the obvious weaknesses in India’s legal protections, it is equally important to keep in mind that this nation has a long history of using ambiguous and overly broad hate speech laws as a practical means of stifling dissent and legitimate expression. The proportionality principle, equality, and dignity must be the cornerstones of any constitutionally valid structure. It would be prudent for the Government of Karnataka to take inspiration from well-established international norms regarding the regulation of hate speech, such as those found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).

Judicial precedents have also consistently emphasized the need for clarity, proportionality, and neutrality in laws affecting free expression. Thus, ambiguous definitions, excessive limits, and unlawful intermediate provisions pose a threat to transforming these laws into powerful tools of arbitrary censorship.

**Varun Pandey is currently in his fourth year at the National University of Juridical Sciences (NUJS)

**Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog do not necessarily align with the views of the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.