Report on The Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025

On 20th August 2025, the Hon’ble Home Minister, introduced the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025 (‘Bill’) in the Lok Sabha. The Bill seeks to ensure that those in positions of executive authority — the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, and their Cabinets — do not act in a manner that undermines constitutional morality or the principles of good governance, thereby eroding the constitutional trust reposed in them by the people. To this end, the Bill provides for the cessation of office of any minister who faces allegations of a serious criminal offence and is arrested and detained for a period of thirty consecutive days. 

Through this Report, we undertake a detailed and comprehensive legal analysis of the Bill. While the intent underlying the Bill is laudable, certain provisions may invite constitutional challenge. Our analysis also reveals textual and definitional ambiguities that could have broader constitutional implications. This Report identifies areas where the provisions may be susceptible to misuse and, in parallel, offers recommendations for reform. We contextualise our findings through the Constituent Assembly Debates, recent Law Commission Reports, and judicial decisions— enabling us to draw lessons not only from the past but also from the contemporary constitutional landscape.

The Report therefore undertakes a thorough examination of the following aspects:

1. The qualifications and disqualifications for membership of Parliament and State Legislature, including those applicable to Cabinet members. 
2. Judicial pronouncements and commission reports addressing the growing need to curb the criminalisation of politics and strengthen the existing legal framework.
3. A comparative analysis of similar frameworks in other leading democratic jurisdictions including the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Germany, France, Australia, Canada, and South Korea.

While the Report provides detailed insights into the constitutional provisions underpinning the Bill and the legal precedents that encourage legislative intervention, its most crucial component lies in the textual analysis and evaluation of the Bill through constitutional provisions, principles, and the basic structure doctrine.

The Report makes the following key observations:

1. Distinction between qualification and cessation: There exists a clear distinction between the process of disqualification and the cessation of office of Ministers envisaged under the Bill. This is evident, first, from the placement and form of the amendment within the constitutional scheme; second, from the trigger which is based on arrest or custody rather than conviction; and third, from the consequence which results in a temporary constitutional disability and not the vacation of a seat and loss of membership of the House.

2. Overbreadth of the cessation condition: The condition of cessation due to detention under an offence punishable with imprisonment of five years or more risks over-breadth, as it would encompass offences that cannot reasonably be characterised as ‘serious criminal offences’ as contemplated by the Statement of Objects and Reasons (‘SoR’) of the Bill.

3. Presumption of innocence: The Bill does not violate the principle of presumption of innocence. It is directed towards preserving institutional integrity rather than adjudicating culpability of the members of the Cabinet. Statutory law and judicial precedent recognise that administrative consequences — including temporary suspension — may follow arrest in the interest of propriety. Accordingly, Article 21 is not infringed, as the Bill constitutes a permissible regulatory measure.

4. Incongruity with procedural timelines: There exists an incongruity between the thirty-day cessation period prescribed by the Bill and the timelines envisaged under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. A closer look at the criminal procedure and precedent highlights that custody extending beyond thirty days is routine, and hence, the Bill’s threshold will almost inevitably result in cessation of office before any meaningful evaluation of the accusations made. This concern is heightened under certain special laws where securing bail is particularly stringent, undermining the procedural checks and balances recognised by judicial pronouncements. 

5. Potential basic structure violations: The Bill contains certain infirmities that may be inconsistent with the basic structure of the Constitution, particularly the features of the rule of law and the equality code. Regarding the rule of law, we note an absence of adequate checks and balances to prevent the concentration of power in the non-traditional executive (i.e., investigative agencies) over the traditional executive (i.e., ministers). With respect to the equality code, the Bill appears under-inclusive and lacks a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved — a deficiency evident from the incongruence between its SoR and its operative provisions — thereby inviting possible challenges under Article 14. The Bill also raises concerns relating to potential misuse thereby undermining federal principles, which, though not amounting to a basic structure violation, could nonetheless enable the destabilisation of coalition governments or those with slender legislative majorities.

Recommendations: Our recommendations are threefold:
(i) Textual reforms — including the introduction of a Schedule specifying relevant offences constituting serious crimes, and linking cessation to the stage of framing of charges;
(ii) Structural reforms — mandating day-to-day trials, their completion within one year, and monitoring of trials involving Ministers by the High Court; and
(iii) Basic structure–compliant reforms — such as revising the SoR and incorporating appropriate institutional checks and balances.

About the Authors

Swapnil Tripathi  (Lead (Charkha))

Swapnil is the Lead at Charkha (Centre for Constitutional Law) at Vidhi. His areas of specialisation are judicial review and constitutional interpretation, with a particular focus on Public Interest Litigation. He read law at the NLU, Jodhpur, and thereafter pursued the BCL and the DPhil at the University of Oxford. He has worked with leading academics on projects involving constitutional reform and democratic transitions, and has also assisted in drafting constitutions for various bodies. His academic writing spans both peer-reviewed journals and public-facing platforms, including a fortnightly column for Bar & Bench titled 'Tryst with the Constitution'. Committed to constitutional literacy, he runs The Basic Structure, a widely read blog that simplifies constitutional law for general audiences. He also collaborates with students across universities to establish forums on constitutional law. He is also an Associate Fellow of the Royal Commonwealth Society, nominated in recognition of his work in the United Kingdom.

Anshul Dalmia (Research Fellow)

Anshul Dalmia is a Research Fellow with the Charkha Team (Centre for Constitutional Law). He recently graduated in 2024 from the University of Oxford with the Bachelor of Civil Law degree as a KC Mahindra Scholar wherein he received the Oxford Law Faculty Prize for the course on 'Constitutionalism in Asia'. He has also completed his undergraduate degree (BA LLB (Hons.)) from the WB National University of Juridical Sciences in 2017 as a gold medallist (Rank 1) in the year 2022.

Aditya Prasanna Bhattacharya (Senior Resident Fellow)

Aditya was a Senior Resident Fellow in the Research Director's Office at the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy. He graduated from the NLSIU Bangalore in 2021 with a BA LLB (Hons). His areas of interest include constitutional law, civil procedure, and dispute resolution. He has academic publications on constitutional law, legislative drafting, and arbitration law in journals such as Statute Law Review and Arbitration International. At Vidhi, he has been providing legislative drafting assistance to various Ministries, Departments, and Authorities of the Central Government and various State Governments.