Doctrine Out of Time

India's NDPS Safeguards Work — Twenty-Two Years Too Late

**Akshay Sreevatsa

In September 2026 the Supreme Court acquitted two men because no one could account for a drug sample’s whereabouts over five days in 2004. The safeguard worked, but nearly twenty-two years late, in a system that registered 1,20,010 NDPS cases in 2023, the latest year reported to Parliament.

A Confession Removed, a Sample Exposed

In October 2020 a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, by majority, took away the prosecution’s most familiar instrument. Tofan Singh v State of Tamil Nadu held that officers empowered under Section 53 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 are “police officers” within Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The confessional statement recorded under Section 67, for decades the spine of an NDPS prosecution, became inadmissible.

The Court has meant it. In Balwinder Singh (2023) it acquitted an accused whose only link to the contraband was his own statement and a co-accused’s; with both excluded, the prosecution case “collapses like a House of cards”.

What Tofan Singh did not settle is what a prosecution rests on once the confession is gone. The answer is a seizure, a sample, and a laboratory report on that sample. The presumptions in Sections 35 and 54 bite only after the prosecution proves possession of a substance that is what it is alleged to be. Since 2020, then, the chain of custody has been the whole game.

One Lakh Cases, One Envelope

A Rajya Sabha reply of April 2026, citing the latest figures then published, records 1,20,010 NDPS cases registered across India in 2023, against 72,721 in 2019: a rise of 65 per cent in four years. At that volume, procedure is not a refinement. It is all that stands between an allegation and, for commercial quantities, ten years’ rigorous imprisonment.

And the regime falls on a particular population. Vidhi’s Mumbai study found that over 97 per cent of the 2017–18 magistrates’ court cases in its dataset concerned personal consumption, and that almost all of those accused pleaded guilty.

The Rule Changed Its Clothes, Not Its Standing

Which quantity was drawn from which packet, in whose presence, under what seal, and whether the same seals reached the laboratory: for thirty-four years these were questions answered by Standing Orders and notifications. Standing Order No. 1/88, issued by the Narcotics Control Bureau on 15 March 1988 and extracted by the Supreme Court in Kashif, required samples to be drawn on the spot, in duplicate, before the search witnesses and the person searched.

On 23 December 2022, Rule 29 of the NDPS (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022 repealed the Standing Orders and the 2007 and 2015 notifications, saving action taken under them. Every seizure since has been governed by delegated legislation made under Sections 52A and 76. The instrument changed its legal character. The judicial treatment of its breach did not.

Statutory in Name, Advisory in Effect

Five judgments trace that treatment. In Khet Singh (2002) the Supreme Court held that the Bureau’s instructions “do not have the force of law”. In Noor Aga (2008) Justice S.B. Sinha observed that such guidelines “cannot be blatantly flouted”. In Union of India v Mohanlal (2016) the Court required samples to be drawn under a Magistrate’s supervision under Section 52A(2), and convictions were set aside in at least three later appeals.

Then came NCB v Kashif, in December 2024. The Court held that the Standing Orders, issued under powers the Act conferred, “had the statutory force”, and, in the same breath, that a lapse under Section 52A(2) is “merely a procedural irregularity” which does not, by itself, vitiate a trial or support bail. The earlier acquittals were confined to their facts.

Seventeen days later, Bharat Aambale v State of Chhattisgarh restated the law in ten conclusions. The procedure prescribed by “the Standing Order(s) / Rules” is “only intended to guide the officers”; substantial compliance suffices; non-compliance is fatal only where it produces discrepancies in the physical evidence.

So the same instruments have been held to lack the force of law and to possess statutory force, and on either view their breach was held not, by itself, to matter. Their promotion into Rules has changed nothing.

To be fair to Bharat Aambale, it is not only restrictive. Where the procedure has not been followed, courts are not to invoke the Section 54 presumption unless otherwise satisfied about the seizure; and once the accused lays a foundation, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt either substantial compliance or that the lapse does not touch its case. Those are real protections. The difficulty is when they arrive.

Twenty-Two Years to Ask Where the Sample Was

The Supreme Court met that difficulty on 16 September 2026. In Abdul Rajik v State of Madhya Pradesh it acquitted two men convicted over charas seized at Jabalpur in November 2004. The maalkhana register recorded the samples going in and never recorded them going out. The forwarding letter was dated 1 December; the laboratory logged receipt on 6 December. Five days were unaccounted for, and the Court found “total non-compliance” with Section 52A.

Applying Kashif and Bharat Aambale, it held that the prosecution had to prove “by proper link evidence” that the samples “remained in safe and secure condition from the time of seizure till their receipt at the FSL”, and that, the link having failed, the report “loses its significance and must be discarded”. With it went the only scientific evidence that the substance was charas at all.

Properly applied, the framework worked. It produced an acquittal. It produced it nearly twenty-two years after the seizure and two decades after conviction on the same record, to establish that nobody could say where an envelope had been for five days. The framework does not fail to detect a broken chain. It fails to detect it in time to matter.

The High Courts Split Along the Trial–Bail Line

The divergence runs along the line between trial and bail. At trial the High Courts have been exacting. The Punjab and Haryana High Court held in Kuldeep Singh v State of Punjab (2024) that contraband becomes primary evidence only when sampled before a Magistrate and tested; the Bombay High Court, in Sunil Basant Malvi v State of Maharashtra (2023), that the entire sampling exercise must be supervised and certified by one.

At bail the same courts grow cautious. In Mukesh Rajaram Chaudhari v State of Maharashtra (2023), before Kashif, the Bombay High Court held that non-compliance with Section 52A, though “one of the relevant considerations”, does not by itself entitle an accused to bail, since the twin conditions in Section 37 still apply. Put the two lines together and you have a regime in which the strongest argument available to an accused is one he must stay in custody for years to make. On 24 September 2026, in Arunprasad v State, the Madras High Court found that samples were re-drawn before a Magistrate 638 days after seizure, unexplained, and that a breach of Section 52A was prima facie made out, and still refused discharge, leaving the question to trial.

In Hanumantha v State of Karnataka (2024), two men were charged with consuming ganja; the laboratory found no narcotic in their blood, and the charge sheet recorded that it had. Quashing the proceedings and ordering departmental action over a “false charge sheet”, the High Court said it was “coming across plethora of cases where there is complete violation of Sections 50 and 52A”.

In Junaid Hussain Haveri (January 2026), Section 67 statements recorded by the Narcotics Control Bureau in June 2023, more than two and a half years after Tofan Singh, each recited that the statement “can be used against anyone as evidence in any court of law”. That is the very proposition the Supreme Court had rejected.

Three Ways to Cross the Commercial Threshold

The figure that triggers the strictest bail regime is itself unstable. Since 2001 the Act has graded punishment by quantity, so that the consumer might be told apart from the trafficker. Three routes now undercut that design, each enlarging the quantity attributed to a single accused.

The first is doctrinal. In Hira Singh v Union of India (2020) a three-judge Bench held that the whole weight of a mixture, neutral substances included, counts towards the commercial threshold, overruling E. Micheal Raj. The second is methodological, and Chandrashekar (2025) shows it: cannabis plants weighed whole, with roots, stems and packaging, came to 27.360 kg, although the Act defines ganja as the flowering or fruiting tops. The third is aggregative. In Nadeem Ahamed v State of West Bengal (August 2025), two men walking together carried about 125 and 130 grams of heroin; neither quantity was commercial, but their sum crossed the 250-gram line, and the trial court added them up. The Supreme Court called it “a grave factual error”.

Bail: The Safeguard That Arrives Too Late

Section 37 bars bail in commercial-quantity cases unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty. Weeks after arrest, before a single witness has been cross-examined, the contention that the recovery is unreliable is exactly the one the court is told cannot, by itself, suffice.

A more defensible reading already exists. In Mohd Muslim v State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) the Court held that a literal reading of Section 37 “would effectively exclude grant of bail altogether, resulting in punitive detention and unsanctioned preventive detention”, and that satisfaction as to innocence can only be “a prima facie determination”. That sits uneasily with the three-judge ruling in Mohit Aggarwal (2022) that length of custody is not by itself a persuasive ground, and with State of Punjab v Gurjit Singh (April 2026), decided with Sukhwinder Singh, which read the speedy-trial right “alongside, and not in displacement of,” Section 37.

In May 2026, in Tasleem Ahmed v State (NCT of Delhi), a Bench sought an “appropriate Bench” to settle the approach to bail “under special statutes where Article 21, prolonged incarceration and statutory restrictions intersect”. The reference arises under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, not the NDPS Act; and in State of Punjab v Balraj Singh (June 2026) the Court noted the reference but still set aside a bail order for want of twin-condition findings. The NDPS accused may be waiting for a reference that never reaches him.

What the Rule Should Say

The remedy is not a new drug policy. It is a consequence for breach, imposed while it can still protect liberty. A draft Section 52B follows.

Draft Section 52B: Proof of sampling and chain of custody

(1) “Sampling record” means everything prepared under section 52A, the inventory, the photographs, the list of samples and the certificate, together with the seizure memo, the seal particulars and a record of every hand the sample passed through until it was analysed. 

(2) If the accused shows, on the face of the record, that section 52A or the rules under it were not followed, the laboratory report stays out of evidence until the prosecution proves that the sample tested was drawn, sealed, stored and sent in substantial compliance with them, and that it remained the same sample throughout. 

(3) If the prosecution cannot prove that the presumption under section 54 does not arise  – unless possession of the alleged substance is proved by other evidence, equally cogent evidence, bound by the same standards as the alleged substance alluded to above.

(4) The seizure, the weighing and the drawing of samples must be videorecorded, and the must form part of the sampling record. If no recording is produced, the burden in sub section (2) falls on the prosecution without the accused having to show anything first. 

(5) Where what is seized is a plant or plant material, the quantity is fixed only after the parts that fall within the statutory definition have been separated out and weighed on their own, and that separation is captured on the recording required by sub-section (4).                 

(6) The sampling record is handed to the accused with the documents supplied under section 230 or section 231 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and any objection to it is decided by the Special Court before the trial begins. 

(7) Every notice and every statement recorded under section 67 must say, on its face, that a confession so recorded is not admissible at the trial of an offence under this Act. 

(8) On a bail application under section 37, material showing on its face that section 52A or the rules under it were not followed is a relevant consideration in deciding whether there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty.

Above, the consequence attaches to the report , rather than to the trial. Hence, non-compliance is fatal only where nothing else proves what was seized. Sub section (3) puts on the face of the statute what Bharat Aambale already holds, because doctrine buried in a judgment’s eighth conclusion is of little use to counsel on a morning list. Sub section (4) moves the initial burden to the party that controls the evidence, and only where the recording that Section 105 of BNSS, 2023 already requires for its own searches is absent. Sub-section (6) answers Abdul Rajik: the sample’s whereabouts are settled before trial, on documents that exist from the first week.

Who Can Make It

Sub-sections (4), (5) and (7), except in sub section (4), concern procedure and record-keeping, and could be implemented now by amending the 2022 Rules under Section 76. Sub sections (2), (3), (6) and (8) touch admissibility, a statutory presumption, pre-trial procedure and bail, and so require Parliament. However, it is no answer that the Court could reach the same result by construing Section 52A differently. The opportunity has come round repeatedly since 2016, and since December 2024 the Court has expressly declined it. The proverbial ship, in that strait, has passed, for our purposes.

Section 31A shows the way. It once prescribed a mandatory death sentence; the Bombay High Court read it down in Indian Harm Reduction Network v Union of India (2011), and Parliament amended it in 2014 to confer a discretion. Where a constitutional defect in an enactment has been exposed in court, Parliament has corrected the text. So the Courts do have the power to force Parliament’s hand to protect liberty from draconian and unfairly applied laws.

What the Act Owes the Accused

Tofan Singh established that an accused may no longer be convicted out of his own mouth, or out of a frightened co-accused’s. Its promise depends on a guarantee no court has yet supplied: an enforceable assurance, available early, that the evidence left standing is what the prosecution says it is.

For thirty-four years that guarantee lived in a Standing Order, and the courts called it guidance. Since December 2022 it has lived in statutory Rules, and the courts still call it guidance. In Thana Singh (2013) the Supreme Court held that Article 21 rights “stand flagrantly violated due to the state of affairs of trials under the NDPS Act”. Thirteen years on, the safeguard on which each of those trials still remains advisory.

A rule whose breach carries no timely consequence is, only a recommendation, and that is an impossible justification to deprive a human being of a decade of liberty. ‘Drug Addicts’ spend decades behind bars because society has marginalised them, and stands at its gates. They can never fully reintegrate, so their only option is to turn to recidivism to stay alive, which becomes a vicious cycle that keeps them away from the flagbearers of our social mores, rather than actually do something humane to help them. We punish them because of our depraved inherited social mores that our imperial colonisers took everything they could. Including our freedom, which is exactly what draconian laws are doing in turn to “drug addicts”. And Imperialism, as Che Guevara once said, “is a bestiality that knows no borders…” 

The only question left, now is, “WHO WILL BE NEXT?” AND WHO WILL BE THERE TO PROTECT JUSTICE?”

**Akshay Sreevatsa is a  Bangalore based legal consultant, researcher and educator. Currently his work involves law & policy reform, ethics, access to justice responsible use of AI.

**Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog do not necessarily align with the views of the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.